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Executive Registry

76-3860/4

16 NOV 1976

For information/audit.

NOTE FOR : Assistant to the DDCI, [REDACTED] Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers

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REFERENCE: Note to Above Addressees frm Compt, dtd 15 Nov 76,
Same Subject

The attached is a paper prepared by Jack Blake for possible use in the transition briefings. It was done by Jack who did not know that Hank had subsequently reviewed the list of possible items and deleted this one. The paper may nevertheless be of use at some point in the briefing process. I am sending it to you simply so you know that it exists.

[REDACTED]

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James H. Taylor
Comptroller

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
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Transition complete

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12 NOV 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified
Intelligence to the Public Information Media

1. The problem of unauthorized disclosures in the news media continues to be a matter of extreme concern. In recent months the number of disclosures of sensitive intelligence in the press has reached epidemic proportions.

2. Admittedly, the problem is not a new one. Office of Security records indicate that between 1959 and the present there have been 284 separate unauthorized public disclosures of classified intelligence information. Seven of the more recent incidents occurred within the past two months. These are now either under review or actively being investigated by appropriate authority.

3. The chronology of official actions and correspondence directed toward curbing unauthorized disclosures is extensive. It is significant that over a period of years the President has seen fit, on four occasions, to emphasize to members of his cabinet and to heads of agencies the need to assure against "leaks" of sensitive information - President Eisenhower on 23 May 1960, President Johnson on 3 December 1966 and 16 February 1968, and President Nixon on 21 December 1970.

4. There have been repetitive requests from the DCI to National Foreign Intelligence Board members that requirements for dissemination of intelligence materials be reviewed and limited, that clearances for access be held to a minimum, and personnel periodically reindoctrinated on the need for security. Systems of compartmentation have been established and maintained for the protection of various categories of sensitive intelligence information and

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personnel security criteria for access to compartmented intelligence have been standardized. The DCI has also personally contacted the heads of departments and agencies to express concern that personnel may be lax about disclosure of intelligence materials and on numerous occasions his concern has been strongly expressed in inter-agency correspondence. On rare occasions the DCI has also authorized direct approaches to newsmen in an effort to secure their cooperation, but these efforts rarely receive fruitful results.

5. While strengthened controls, personal concern by high officials and improved procedures may temporarily reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosures, it is obvious that they do not go far enough to cure the illness.

6. What those who leak classified information and those who publish it may not fully realize is that in addition to the risks to national security which their actions involve, the disclosures can also result in sizeable monetary costs to the U. S. Government. Such costs are oftentimes difficult to measure, but the fact remains that disclosure of the manner in which certain information is acquired stimulates and enables the target country to take new measures to insure against further U. S. access to data of the type disclosed.

7. Public disclosures of classified intelligence gives the USSR and other foreign powers keen insight into the capabilities and limitations of our intelligence system. It also undermines the attitude toward security at all levels of government. If disclosures of our most guarded secrets and our most sensitive sources and methods of collecting intelligence continue to make their appearance in the news media, the end result is a loss of faith in the system designed to protect such matters. It threatens the very safety and welfare of those who may be providing us intelligence at a substantial personal risk.

8. It is a tragedy to see articles in the news media quoting our intelligence reports verbatim without regard to possible damage to sensitive collection programs. The inevitable result of such disclosures can only mean a sharp curtailment of the effectiveness, if not the disappearance of some of our most important intelligence sources, human as well as technical. Typical recent examples are set forth in attachments.

9. Although a number of actions have been taken to close the security gap within the intelligence community through the personal representation by Directors of CIA backed by strong expressions of Presidential concern, the United States Government is powerless without appropriate legislation to improve the chances of prosecution to the fullest extent of the law. Further, restrictions imposed on investigation by federal agencies make it virtually impossible to identify the source(s) of such disclosures. The unlawful disclosure of intelligence sources and methods which have been kept secret at great cost to the American taxpayer should be investigated to the full extent of our government's capability.

10. A matter of current frustration is the inability of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to proceed beyond preliminary investigation on cases of apparent compromise of classified information until they are in receipt of a Department of Justice Criminal Division determination as to the prospects of prosecution.

11. The public exposure of our intelligence reporting is destructive to our society and tends to weaken our efforts to defend ourselves against nations which would benefit from our political, economic and military collapse.

Robert W. Gambino

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November 11, 1976

SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CONGRESS

Substantive intelligence support for Congress simply means providing up-to-date information on and analysis of foreign developments of topical interest to a wide variety of committees, members, and committee staffs. It does not encompass information on CIA operations.

While there has been no legal requirement to provide this intelligence to Congress, the Agency has been supplying it to a growing Congressional market for three years. This is a decided break with the past when substantive intelligence usually was provided only to CIA oversight committees through semi-annual DCI briefings.

The initiative was Director Colby's. Mr. Colby felt quite strongly that a Congress determined to have a more forceful voice in national security and foreign affairs could play its role more constructively if it was well informed. Mr. Bush endorses this view, too.

Most often substantive intelligence is transmitted through briefings, but we also provide written material such as biographic reports on foreign officials, maps, and intelligence memoranda on various issues. The seven committees which have some oversight role also receive the National Intelligence

Daily.* Access to the Daily is restricted to members and a few key staffers. With the Daily, the committees have an opportunity to see the same all-source intelligence being presented policy-makers. The President's Daily Brief is never provided the Hill. Documents which deal with sensitive ongoing negotiations also are withheld.

While the DCI still spends a good deal of time on the Hill, the substantive support is provided principally by CIA analysts talking to members and staffers. The Intelligence Directorate, which handles most of these briefings, has a small staff responsible for substantive intelligence liaison with the Congress. During the first three quarters of 1976, this staff was involved in briefings for 29 subcommittees, 66 individual senators or congressmen, and over 100 committee staffers. The subjects ranged from the technical aspects of Soviet weapons to the state of Tito's health.

As you might expect, there are inherent problems in providing intelligence to Congress. The most serious one is that CIA's intelligence has been used as ammunition against some Administration foreign policy or national security proposals. Press leaks of substantive intelligence have been rare. Still, the opportunity for trying to make political mileage with

*Senate Armed Services, Senate Appropriations, Senate Foreign Relations, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, House Armed Services, House Appropriations, and House International Relations

press leaks of sensitive intelligence remains worrisome.

Is it all worthwhile? From the Agency's point of view, it is useful. We have shown members that CIA is far more than a clandestine enigma. For its part, the Congress certainly looks on the new relationship as a valuable one to which its members have a right.

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DCI RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

DCI relations with Congress fall basically into the following areas:
General Legislative Oversight, Appropriations, Covert Action, Substantive Intelligence Support, Investigations of Intelligence Community Activities by Non-oversight Committees and Legislation.

I. General Oversight -- is handled by the Select Committee on Intelligence with 15 members and by Subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees involving a total of 14 members.

II. Appropriations -- Are handled by Subcommittees of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees involving a total of 18 members.

III. Covert Action -- Is handled in addition to the above committees by Subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees with a total of 9 members, which receive reports on all covert action programs pursuant to statute (Sec 662 of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended).

IV. Substantive Intelligence Support -- Is rendered to a number of other committees, offices (e. g. Congressional Budget Office) and individual members.

V. Investigations of Intelligence Community Activities by Non-oversight Committees -- Arises on an ad hoc basis and we are anticipating heavy support to the new House Select Committee on Assassinations which will be investigating, at least initially, the deaths of former President Kennedy and Martin Luther King.

VI. Legislation -- Is formulated, where needed, and monitored to ensure that our activities are not impacted unintentionally.

The above areas of interest are more specifically defined below.

I. General Legislative Oversight

A. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

1. Responsibilities: The SSCI has exclusive jurisdiction over CIA and sequential jurisdiction over the remainder of the IC and has, basically, the following responsibilities:

- legislation
- annual appropriation authorization
(for the first time -- previously funds were appropriated without an annual authorization)
- matters generally, including oversight to ensure policy makers get necessary, accurate and timely intelligence, and to ensure rights of American citizens are not infringed.

2. Issues:

- Separation of Powers. The determination of the members and staff to be fully and currently informed of intelligence activities will pose serious questions with respect to striking a balance between

prerogatives of the committee and executive privilege.

- Budget disclosures. The committee may well vote to release publicly budget figures for the National Foreign Intelligence ^{Program} plan and/or totals for each IC component. Of the 15 members of the committee, 10 have previously voted to reveal the budget, 3 have voted against public release, and 2 have not been recorded on the issue.

Disclosure of sensitive information. The committee can vote to disclose any information they wish to. If they do so, the President has 5 days to object and if he does so, the committee reconsiders its vote. If it votes again to disclose, it then goes to the full Senate for discussion and vote, which can result in referral back to committee for decision.

- Proliferation of sensitive information. In spite of the committees conscientious effort to maintain strict security, the number of people involved (15 members, almost 50 staffers) and possible turnover poses problems.

3. Opportunities.

- Charter. The Committee has created an ad hoc subcommittee to study charters and guidelines. Any revision will have a lasting effect on the IC.

This will present the opportunity to provide specific authority to conduct espionage and covert action as well as to clearly set out any other authority, or limitations the IC should be governed by.

-- Quality of Intelligence. A subcommittee is currently studying this area and the committee has been directed to complete the study by 1 July 1977. This will provide the IC with the opportunity to tell its story with respect to intelligence collection.

-- Congressional and Public Trust. The thorough and serious approach of the committee and staff will, in large measure, help to restore trust and confidence in the IC.

B. Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Subcommittee.

While this subcommittee technically exercises general oversight jurisdiction, due to the advent of the SSCI, these responsibilities have de facto shifted to the new committee. Even so, we are continuing to keep the committee informed of IC matters generally. The Committee is especially kept informed on matters of foreign military intelligence. It will have an active role and influence on the authorization of IC appropriations.

C. House Armed Services Committee, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence.

1. Responsibilities.

-- legislation

-- matters generally other than appropriations

with special emphasis to ensure the subcommittee is kept currently informed of foreign intelligence developments with particular emphasis on foreign weaponry.

2. Issues. None

3. Opportunities.

Joint or House oversight. While it is appreciative of the problems of fractionated jurisdiction in the House and the proliferation of sensitive information which would be resolved by a House committee similar to the SSCI, it may be reluctant to relinquish its unique jurisdiction.

-- Legislation. The subcommittee could provide valuable support in obtaining passage of Agency-proposed legislation such as sources and methods and 2 deputies.

II. Appropriations Oversight

A. Senate Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Operations Subcommittee

1. Responsibilities.

-- Appropriations. Since the Senate follows the House in the appropriations process, Senate action is generally limited to adjusting House figures. During the past few

years, the subcommittee has tended to restore some funds cut by the House.

2. Issues. Subcommittee work has suffered from its failure to allocate sufficient staff personnel to reviewing intelligence budgets. This situation has been remedied somewhat with the recent assignment of a Majority staff member to the subcommittee and by a decision of the Minority clerk to devote more time to the intelligence budget.
3. Opportunities. With the added staff interest in the intelligence budget, it should be possible to present IC arguments in such a way as to off-set decisions made by the House which adversely affect IC programs.

B. House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee.

1. Responsibilities.

-- Appropriations with respect to the IC budget and its cost effectiveness. Its report is issued in a short unclassified statement and a very detailed classified annex. The Chairman, in fulfillment of his responsibilities to the House, has offered to all members of the House the right to see the IC budget and the subcommittee report thereon.

2. Issues.

-- Access to information. In pursuit of its responsibilities, the staff has asked for and received an enormous amount of sensitive information on all aspects of IC programs. Such requests have included information which the IC maintains is privileged Executive Branch information and has been denied by the IC. These denials in large part have led to the investigations mentioned below.

-- Interjection of Subcommittee into Executive Branch policy and management decisions. An example of this is the Subcommittee staffs refusal to deal with the DCI's Legislative and General Counsels on non--CIA matters. Various proposals have been made to solve these problems but so far without success. Other examples are to be found in major cuts imposed on certain IC programs.

-- Subcommittee investigations. Currently the Surveys and Investigations Staff has underway separate investigations into IC activities including SIGINT, Communications, Training and a full review of CIA/DDO activities. These investigations, coming on the heels of the Rockefeller, Church and Pike investigations have cost the IC considerably in terms of lost man hours and disruption of morale.

3. Opportunities.

-- The transition period would be a propitious time to curtail somewhat the seemingly endless number of investigations.

- This period could also be well utilized to formulate Executive Branch policy with respect to the requests for internal documents and other information considered privileged.
- The development of closer ties to members of the subcommittee could help to alleviate somewhat the stresses experienced with the staff.
- The provision of a technical expert to the subcommittee during markup, if allowed by the subcommittee, could help to ensure that any cuts made of major IC programs are made based on a full knowledge of the facts.

C. Senate and House Budget Committee. Recent changes in the law provide for increased oversight of all Executive Branch budgets. It is uncertain at this time to what extent these Committees will be provided detailed access to IC budgets, but they no doubt will receive the total figures hopefully under a condition of non-disclosure.

III. Covert Action

A. Responsibilities.

Current law requires that the appropriate committees (seven committees, including the subcommittees mentioned in I and II and the Senate Foreign Relations (SFRC) and the House International Relations (HIRC) Committee) receive reports on the scope and description of all covert action programs found necessary by the President.

B. Issues.

- Proliferation of sensitive information. The above procedures mean that at a minimum 56 members of Congress will be informed of all covert action programs conducted by the IC under the direction of the President. In addition to such members, the principle staff member of those subcommittees also attend such briefings. Also, SFRC and HIRC procedures allow any member of the full committee to receive information provided the subcommittees. Technically, all 435 members of the House have access to any committee records.
- Public release of covert action information. The proliferation of such information as outlined above has led to numerous instances where considerable information on covert action programs has been released to the public. Such release has jeopardized a number of programs and has led to the cancellation of at least one major program.

C. Opportunities

The current period could be utilized to review the above procedures to see if a modification thereof might be in order and possible.

IV. Substantive Intelligence Support.

A. Non-oversight committees.

1. Responsibilities.

Under the current procedures, the IC briefs any committee on the substantive intelligence available on almost any subject requested. In doing so, however, no operational matters or sensitive intelligence which would reveal intelligence sources and methods is provided. When questions arise with respect to the latter, the committees are politely referred to the appropriate oversight subcommittees.

2. Issues. In the past, certain committees were not satisfied with the procedures with respect to the refusal to provide operational or sensitive information, however, in most cases, they abided thereby.

3. Opportunities. The transition period provides an appropriate time to review these procedures and to obtain policy guidance thereon.

B. Leadership and Individual Members of Congress.

The IC has worked out a system whereby the Majority and Minority leaders of the House, and to a lesser extent Senate leadership, as kept currently informed of intelligence with respect to worldwide events of significance. In addition, individual members can and do ask for and receive briefings on a wide range of subjects of interest to them in formulating positions on proposed legislation and in preparation for trips abroad.

V. Investigations of IC Activities by Non-oversight Committees

House Select Committee on Assassinations. The IC is currently establishing liaison with this new committee with the objective of ensuring that it receives and handles in an appropriate manner all information relevant to its charter. It is expected that this will entail a large number of man-hours over an extended period.

VI. Legislation.

A. Draft Proposals Already Submitted.

1. Intelligence Sources and Methods.

-- Purpose: The DCI has statutory responsibility to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. The lack of criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure continues to present a serious problem for the Government's National Foreign Intelligence Program. Recent publication of books and articles by persons having authorized access to sensitive intelligence information have damaged the Government's foreign efforts. Legislation establishing criminal sanctions for such unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods is considered to be a very important deterrent. It would not apply to ^{or} unauthorized recipient _A or the publication of the material by newsmen, etc.

-- Status: The legislation was transmitted by the President to the 94th Congress and introduced as H. R. 12006 but no further action was taken.

2. Two Deputies.

--Purpose: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the CIA and the positions of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Over the years, as the requirements, responsibilities and workload of the DCI have increased--particularly his duty to oversee and coordinate the functioning of the Intelligence Community--it has become increasingly apparent that a second statutory Deputy Director is needed if the DCI is to properly carry out his duties and to ensure the most effective functioning of U. S. foreign intelligence. The Rockefeller Commission recommended the creation of a second DDCI position. The President, in Executive Order 11905 (issued 18 February 1976), directed that the day-to-day functioning of the CIA be directed by the DDCI and that the position of "Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community" be established to assist the DCI in his supervision of the IC.

--Status: The proposed legislation was approved by OMB for transmittal to the Congress in September 1976.

B. Other Legislation.

1. Charter Revision.

-- Reason. The SSCI has created a subcommittee to study and propose charter revisions. The predecessor Church committee recommended a number of charter changes.

-- If it is determined that the charter is to be revised, included should be explicit authority to conduct espionage and covert action with the necessary infrastructure. Such a revision should also explicitly define the authority and limitations of the DCI and the IC.

2. Establishment of a Joint Committee on Oversight or House House Select Committee on Intelligence.

-- Need. While the House exercises oversight over the IC, it has not set up machinery equivalent to the SSCI in spite of pressure by a number of House members to take action to pull abreast of the Senate. Creation of a House version of the SSCI, if it had the necessary exclusive jurisdiction, would help diminish the proliferation of information. However, an even greater reduction could

be accomplished through the establishment of a joint committee. It makes sense to push for a joint committee at this time before the House sets up its "SSCI" in order to avoid the problem of parochial interests that would go along with an "HSCI". Also, the SSCI is to make recommendations in the summer of 1977 concerning the structure of congressional oversight in the Congress.

-- Revision of House Rules. Concurrently with the establishment of a "HSCI", House Rule XI should be modified to ensure that IC information is not made available to all House members requesting such information.

3. Repeal of Sec. 662 (Covert Action Reporting)

Since the purpose of a Joint committee would be to concentrate oversight and avoid proliferation, repeal of Sec. 662 should be part and parcel of the joint committee legislation. However, in repealing Sec. 662, some provision must be made to protect the legitimate interests of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee in being aware of those matters which affect or support the foreign policy of the U.S..

4. Firearms Legislation.

-- Purpose. The only authority to carry firearms now in existence relates solely to the protection of classified documents. There is a need to protect certain IC persons and to authorize those charged with this responsibility to carry firearms for this purpose.


5. Electronic surveillance. The DCI supported a carefully drawn Bill on this subject during the 94th Congress. While that Bill did not reach the floor, it most likely will emerge during the next session and must be carefully monitored.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>ER</i>		
ROOM NO. <i>4E12</i>	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>Mr. Taylor has hand carried Mr. Knoche's copy to him.</i>		
FROM: <i>O/GO mpt</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 53

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Transition Arrangements

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1. Mr. Lehman gave us a good rundown at the Morning Meeting today on the session yesterday with Mr. Watson re transition arrangements. After the meeting, the four Deputies, Mr. Evans, [redacted] and I met briefly to review where we are and to consider what next steps might be appropriate.

2. So far you have asked that the following material be prepared for your background or for possible use with Mr. Carter:

- A briefing book on the CIA program, costs, personnel levels, budget process, etc. We got a draft up to you last night, and we need your reaction to it.
- A paper on liaison relationship issues. Mr. Wells is doing this.
- A paper on the status of covert action activities. Mr. Wells is doing this.
- A paper on collection against hard targets. Mr. Wells is doing this.
- A paper on U.S. reconnaissance satellite systems and some graphics which might be used to explain their capabilities. Mr. Dirks is doing this.
- A paper on R&D in CIA and some examples of sophisticated equipment which might be shown. Mr. Dirks is doing this.

3. In reviewing the evolving arrangements, Mr. Lehman made the point that we should consider pulling together a short series of very concisely stated issue papers for the Carter transition team member who will be named as liaison with CIA shortly and who will need the papers at the beginning of the week. He underlined that these papers were to be focused on problems of Presidential importance and were to be extremely brief and to the point. We discussed the following items as candidate papers. I have made no arrangements to do any work on any of them pending your review. The list is probably too

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long; perhaps half of the items should not be considered for preparation by Monday.

- Possible Revisions in the Executive Order.
It seems to us that the current management arrangements at the top are almost certain to come under review. I gave you Monday a very short paper on this subject. There is a question whether you or Admiral Murphy should prepare such a paper.
- Department of Justice Problems. This would be a short paper focused on on-going investigations, the Attorney General position on electronic surveillances, relationships with U.S. law enforcement authorities, and the issues surrounding "information on U.S. persons."
- Legislation We Have Submitted to Congress. (The double deputy legislation and the amendments on secrecy.) A status report on these would be desirable. Also to be included under this would be a piece on FOIA issues.
- Congressional Relationships. A paper outlining the responsibilities of the various committees, problems and opportunities.
- The Communications Issue. This is being actively pursued by the House Appropriations Committee.
- The SIGINT Transfer Issue.
- Relationships Overseas between Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station. This paper might review the history of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon letters and current arrangements.
- Substantive Support to Congress. The Administration should be aware of the extent to which we are providing substantive information to Congress and the various arrangements in existence. A short section on the potential pitfalls in these arrangements would be important.
- Relationships with Foreign Intelligence Services. Mr. Wells thought this was probably a secondary issue which should be dealt with at a future time, but it is included here as possibly relevant now. The idea would be to explain what the relationships are, what issues have arisen in those relationships as a result

of revelations in the U.S., the Korean CIA problem, etc. This paper, and that to be prepared as a briefing aid (above), may in fact be the same thing.

- CIA Relationships with a Changing Foreign Policy Apparatus.
We discussed this question briefly and did not come to a concise statement of it. The basic idea would be to outline how CIA related to the National Security Council and the Department of State under Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. We might then perhaps set down some desirable broad guidelines to be taken into account as the new Administration organizes its foreign policy apparatus.

4. I have circulated copies of this to [redacted] the four Deputies and Mr. Evans. We need your decision on which papers should be started, and we need to make action assignments for them.

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[redacted]
James H. Taylor
Comptroller

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Distribution:

Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - DDA
1 - DDI
1 - DDO
1 - DDS&T
1 - Ex. Sec.
1 - [redacted]
1 - ER
1 - Compt Subj
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1 - Compt
1 - AC,R
1 - C/AG
1 - C/IG
1 - C/OG
1 - S&T G

O/Comptroller/JHTaylor/hr 11/10/76

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Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
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11	IG				
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16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
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SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

For follow-up action on paragraph 2 of the DDCI's attached note to the DCI.

D/Executive Secretary
 5 Nov 76

Date

3637 (7-76)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

*Transition file
 White House*

The Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Executive Registry
76-3860/1

Washington, D.C. 20505


5 November 1976

NOTE FOR: The Director

Subject : Transition Arrangements

In this notebook we have provided some advice and suggestions for you to consider at the outset of the transition and we have, beginning on page A-1, set forth a variety of topics we consider to be worth discussions and briefings with the new administration during the period of the transition.

With your approval, we would like to give this some limited distribution within the Agency and in the IC Staff and NIOs in order to get the work underway as early and as effectively as possible.



E. H. Knoche

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Attachment
Notebook a/s

APPROVE DISTRIBUTION

[Handwritten signature]
DCI

(DDCI was advised of
DCI approval)

NOV 12 20 54 1976

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

4 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
SUBJECT : Transition Arrangements

1. We think it important that you see the President-elect personally as soon as possible. I probably should accompany you or, if you prefer and he is willing, see him myself. Our alternative is for me to deal with Stu Eizenstat, but there would be problems with this. He cannot speak for Carter, his future role is not yet defined, and there are some things that ought to be said directly to Carter.

2. If we are able to see Carter, we should be prepared to do the following:

a. Establish channels for liaison with him, the Vice-President elect, and their staffs.

b. Seek his agreement to some or all of the agenda attached to this memorandum, but especially the assignment of a personal briefing officer.

c. Inform him of the National Foreign Intelligence Program and its relationship to the budgets of DoD, CIA, etc.

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e. Warn him of the problems of telephone security.

f. Brief on important recent developments, if any justify it.

g. Respond to questions on recent intelligence related stories in the media, e.g., Backfire, Letelier.

3. You will remember that in 1968 we established a beachhead in New York to provide briefings and other services to the Nixon Administration as it formed. We never saw Nixon, but did have almost daily contact with Kissinger and Mitchell. In dealing with the Carter team, there are two cautions we should keep in mind, both deriving from this experience.

a. We have the foundations for an excellent relationship with Carter and his Administration. Many of his appointees, however, are likely to be both ignorant of intelligence capabilities and highly suspicious of intelligence activities and of CIA in particular. Our stance should be forthcoming, as open as possible, but not pushy. Above all, we should not talk down to the new people or tell them how to do their business. Our problems in '68 stemmed partly from our ignorance of the character of the Nixon staff and its pervasive hostility toward the bureaucracy, partly from the cocksureness, if not arrogance, with which some of our number approached them. Kissinger was informed, for instance, that he should not read raw cables, but rather should rely on CIA to tell him what he needed to know. We also sought to put our own officer in charge of the White House Situation Room, on grounds that only CIA could do this right. (The proposal was and probably still is a good one, but it apparently came across to the Nixon people as an effort by CIA to control them.)

b. The whole world closes in on a President-elect and his staff. The pressures from people who have ideas, or things, or themselves, to sell are enormous. The telephone switchboards break down. Calls are never returned. Messages do not reach the addressee. The staff, acutely conscious of the rapidly diminishing time before Inauguration,

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reacts to this pressure by becoming defensive if not antagonistic. We will have to remember not to overload and not to expect too much time from overworked staff. Their now orderly plans will almost certainly be disrupted by the pressures they will undergo. Under such circumstances, it will be most desirable to install our briefing officer inside the Secret Service compound as a recognized part of the team. Otherwise his access will probably be minimal.

25X1 4. [] has seen a draft of this memorandum and his suggestions have been incorporated.

[]

Richard Lehman

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Attachment

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An Agenda for DCI Support to the President-Elect

- I. Briefings for Carter Himself (Should also eventually be given to staff)
 - A. Completion of Substantive Briefings Begun in July (NIOs work with CIA)
 1. Middle East
 2. Petroleum & Petrodollars
 3. Intelligence in Verification
 4. Soviet & Chinese update, plus Soviet economy
 5. Southern Africa & Horn
 6. Korea
 7. Italy, Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
 8. Proliferation
 - B. Community Matters (IC Staff with others as appropriate)
 1. The Community
 2. NFIP
 3. E.O. 11905, CFI weaknesses, CI guidelines & AG, charters
 4. Collection Systems, especially satellites [REDACTED]
 - C. CIA Matters (CIA elements as appropriate)
 1. CIA organization & capabilities
 2. Covert Action & OAG
 3. Terrorism
 4. Narcotics
 - D. Problems with Congress: SSCI, vacuum in House, HAC, Hughes-Ryan (All)

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II. Current Intelligence Service to Carter and Designated Staff

- A. Provide the PDB in its present form.
- B. Assign a qualified DDI officer to deliver the PDB as his personal briefing officer. His mission would be to provide feedback and to establish the basis for a new system or publication designed especially for Carter.
- C. Move gradually to this new arrangement while maintaining the present PDB for Ford until Inauguration.
- D. Establish a secure installation for this activity within Carter's security perimeter in Washington, Atlanta or Plains.

III. Recommended Actions with NSC & Personal Staff

- A. Identify, clear & brief.
- B. Provide detailed briefings as appropriate.
- C. Develop plan for intelligence input to assumed new NSC system.
- D. Develop plan for intelligence input to assumed initial review of military and foreign policy.
- E. Develop relations and mechanisms that will provide policy feedback (avoid a new NODIS problem, etc.) to intelligence and tie intelligence production to policy concerns.

IV. Recommended Actions Re Other Appointees (State, DoD, Treasury)

Offer services & briefings, but take passive stance.
(Departments themselves will move in fast.)

V. Administrative

Some of these arrangements will require considerable support from the DDA, who will name a focal point in order to see that appropriate arrangements are made for:

- A. Security sweeps of any premises utilized by the President-elect and his staff.
- B. Initiate clearances on principals and staff members to include provision of compartmented security briefings.

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- C. Courier service, safekeeping (safes) and retrieval of intelligence publications and other sensitive documents.
- D. Provide secure communications if desired at Plains or Atlanta.

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